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INTERVIEW 





        Peter Singer1                   _ 










Julien Delord (J.D.) : -“ Pr. Singer, what is the overarching goal of your thought beyond the 
defense of utilitarianism, i.e. the reduction of pain and the maximization of pleasure 
in the world? Is there a theory behind your choice of causes to which you apply your 
ethics or is it just a matter of subjective inclination?” 
 
Peter Singer (P.S.) : -“  This is a strange question, because you state what the ultimate goal 
is, and then you ask what is beyond it. But first, let’s state the goal more accurately. 
Since I’m a preference utilitarian, my goal is not exactly the reduction of pain and 
the maximization of pleasure, but rather the maximization of the satisfaction of 
preferences. The goal, in other words, is that beings with conscious preferences 
should, as far as possible, have what they prefer. Stronger, or more intense 
preferences, of course, get more weight in this calculation than weaker ones.  
 
That is the goal of my form of utilitarianism. But your question seeks some goal 
beyond that. No, there is nothing beyond it. Why should there be anything beyond it?   
 
You also inquire about my choice of causes to which I apply my ethics. My choice 
isn’t a matter of subjective inclination, but on the other hand there is nothing so deep 
                                            
1 A short biography fo Pr. Singer follows the interview. 
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behind it that I would use the term “theory” either. It’s simply a matter of where I 
think I may be able to do some good, by persuading people to take a different view. 
So it is partly how important the topic is, partly whether I feel I have something new 
to say that has not already been said, and of course partly whether I feel that my 
particular philosophical skills have anything to contribute to the issue.” 
 
 
J.D.: -“ In an autobiography you made reference to the history of your Viennese Jewish 
grandparents who where deported and murdered by the Nazis. You reveal the shock 
you experienced when confronted by this painful family history as well as the 
absurdities of the religious teaching influenced you deeply in your philosophical 
preferences for ethics and utilitarianism. Several times, you mention that even in the 
worst conditions, there are still humans who help others, just for the sake of doing 
Good. However, can the example of these “ordinary heroes” who helped your 
parents and the Jews be generalized? Isn’t in this respect your ethics too heroic and 
reserved to a small human elite? Isn’t Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the Shoah as the 
consequence of the negation of individual responsibility in modern bureaucratic and 
political institutions a more reliable analysis in order to avoid such a tragedy in the 
future?” 
 
P.S.: -“ First, I don’t believe I have ever said as confidently as you put it here that the tragic 
history of my family influenced me towards studying ethics or becoming a 
utilitarian.  Maybe it did, but it is impossible to sort out the different influences. If 
circumstances had been a little different when I went to university, I might, with the 
same family history, have become a lawyer and never studied ethics seriously. And I 
think my family background is compatible with a variety of ethical views, not just 
utilitarianism. What I do think is probable is that my family background made me 
feel strongly that oppressive, authoritarian governments are wrong, and that the use 
of force has to be a last resort. I also think my reading of holocaust history gave me a 
strong sense of empathy with the weak and the oppressed, the victims of unchecked 
power and brutality. But, again, that does not entail utilitarianism. 
 
I don’t have a religious temperament, and my parents were not really religious even 
before the holocaust. But the existence of the holocaust does seem to me a powerful 
argument against the traditional Christian view that there is an omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnibenevolent deity. If there is a deity who is omniscient and 
omnipotent, he or she must be a monster to allow things like the holocaust to happen. 
Even the claim that the holocaust happened because god gave humans free will – 
which seems to me a feeble excuse to make on behalf of an omniscient being, who 
would have seen the consequences of this grant of free will – does not apply to the 
slow agonizing deaths of beings, human or nonhuman, caught in a drought.   
 
Now to the issues of the heroic people who rescued Jews in the holocaust. I never 
said that they were typical of human beings, or that their actions are generalizable. I 
made no quantitative estimates. I simply indicated that such people exist, and they 
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prove the possibility of human altruism, that is, that we are not genetically 
programmed or determined to be vicious or purely self-interested. The existence of 
these heroes does not prove that humans are typically altruistic, let alone heroic. It is 
true to say that the holocaust was only possible because most people are not like 
those heroes. Most people do not want to stand out from the crowd, so they will 
follow the leader. Some people are actively malevolent to their fellow humans, 
especially their fellow humans from a different race or ethnic group.   
 
That doesn’t mean that I agree with Arendt that the holocaust was the “consequence 
of the negation of individual responsibility in modern bureaucratic and political 
institutions.” The negation of individual responsibility is nothing new, and the 
holocaust needed a bureaucracy only because of its vast scale and because the 
Germans, typically, wanted to do it as thoroughly as possible. The potential for 
humans to commit genocide against other peoples goes back far beyond 
bureaucracy. Just look at what, according to the Hebrew bible, the ancient Israelites 
did to the Midianites. (Numbers, Chapter 31.)” 
 
J.D.: -“ Against people who caricature utilitarianism as a “pig philosophy” or pure 
hedonistic selfishness, you reply according to your hierarchical axiology of sentient 
beings that we must put the emphasis on higher level virtues like artistic and moral 
emotions, reason and intelligence. However, it seems that you don’t give really 
credit to the idea that some of your opponents might really feel an acute moral pain 
at seeing for instance severely disabled babies killed and the sanctity of human life 
violated. To impose a law based on your rational universalist utilitarianism in a 
society which is not ready to accept it might indeed cause more pain than pleasure. 
Don’t utilitarians practice a kind of double standard in appealing to higher moral 
satisfaction, like pure altruism, only when it strengthens their argument and discard 
these feelings when they come from other moral or religious sources?” 
 
P.S.: -“ What exactly is the caricature of utilitarianism we are considering here? We need to 
separate the objection, already discussed by John Stuart Mill, that utilitarianism is a 
philosophy for pigs, from the objection that it is a philosophy of selfishness, or 
egoism. The latter objection can only be based on ignorance, because there is 
nothing at all selfish about utilitarianism – in fact, the more serious objection is 
precisely the opposite, that it is too demanding for beings like us, because it is 
impartial in its concerns. “Each to count for one and none for more than one” does 
not allow the agent to give any more weight to his or her own interests than to the 
interests of strangers. 
 
The former objection is that utilitarianism is a philosophy for pigs, because it allows 
the pleasures of pigs the same weight as the pleasures of human beings. Bentham did 
not shy away from this implication when he said that “quantities of pleasure being 
equal, pushpin [a simple game played in pubs in Bentham’s day] is as good as 
poetry.” Your question suggests that I take a different view, that I hold that “we must 
put the emphasis on higher level virtues like artistic and moral emotions, reason and 
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intelligence.” But I am puzzled as to why you think so, because I’ve never said such 
a thing. I give no preference to artistic interests over simple interests in physical 
pleasure. As I have said, it is the strength of the interest that matters. It is only when 
I discuss issues of life and death that I think reason and intelligence make a 
difference, because they make it possible for beings to have an interest in the future 
that other beings, lacking any self-awareness cannot have.  So when we kill a being 
with the capacity for understanding that it has a future, we can be thwarting an 
interest that is different from any interest we can thwart if we kill a being not capable 
of understanding that it has a future. But we should distinguish questions about the 
wrongness of taking life, from questions about what weight should be given to the 
interests of beings while they are alive.   
 
Since your question misstates my position, the objection you mention at the end of 
the question does not apply. I do not give any special weight to the emotion of pure 
altruism, and I do give weight to the feelings of people who would be disturbed to 
know that severely disabled babies are being killed. But we have to be careful, in 
general, about giving too much weight to the opinions of those who are not directly 
affected by something. If we had given too much weight to the views of whites in the 
American south in the 1950s, we would not have gone ahead with racial integration, 
because these white racists were deeply disturbed at the prospect of having to sit 
next to an African American on a bus, or at a lunch counter. That was a terrible 
situation for African Americans, and as they were most directly affected, it was right 
to give their views the most weight. Now the whites have adjusted, and most of them 
accept that racism is wrong. Similarly, in the case of euthanasia for severely disabled 
infants, it is the families and the infant itself – plus, I would add, although this is a 
philosophically difficult and disputed point, the interests of any future child that the 
parents might have if the disabled one dies but would not have if the disabled child 
lives - who are most affected by it, and whose interests should be given the most 
weight. 
 
J.D.: -“ I would like to discuss your position in favor of the use of biotechnologies and 
genetic modifications. The first example will concern cloned and/or transgenic 
domestic animals: because of the high frequency of severe gestation abnormalities in 
these experiments, the production of such animals often implies to consider the 
balance between foetal suffering and suffering of the recipient mother, particularly 
among bovine. The main decision criteria if it is worth or not to let the pregnancy 
continue is, from a scientific point of view, firstly to save the foetus life if possible 
because of the value of such animals, and secondly to take into account the cow 
suffering. Would you approve this particular analysis from an utilitarian point of 
view? If not, why? Are there better ways of considering this issue? 
 
P.S.: -“ I’m not sure if the bovine foetus can actually suffer, at least until very late in 
pregnancy. (Just as I doubt that human foetuses can feel pain, at least until very late 
in pregnancy.) But we should certainly take into account the suffering of the cow, 
and of the calf if it is born and has abnormalities.   
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I have no objection to the analysis you mention, as long as the suffering of the 
animals is given its full weight, and not discounted, as it so often is, because they are 
“not human”. Also when you refer to “the value of such animals” we should make it 
clear that we are talking of possible benefits to everyone, for example through the 
production of pharmaceutical substances in the milk, and not simply economic 
benefit to the owner.   
 
I don’t know any better ways of considering the issue.” 
 
J.D.: -“ The second example deals with the possibility given to parents by genetic counseling 
and engineering to have children safe of genetic defects and even  positively 
enhanced, what Jürgen Habermas call “private eugenics”.  You say that you don’t 
think that it is intrinsically wrong to use genetic selection if “in each particular case, 
a particular kind of genetic selection is not wrong because of the bad consequences it 
will have for the child or for society.” Insofar as we can’t predict the consequences 
of such genetic changes, especially on psychological, social and even moral levels, it 
seems that we touch the limits of a consequentialist ethic like utilitarianism. 
Therefore, should we allow this kind of eugenics until we have some evidence to 
weigh its benefits, to hold on our judgement or to invoke a superior principle 
(precautionary principle for instance)?” 
 
P.S.: -“ It is true that we can’t predict the benefits of the genetic changes for which parents 
might select in the future. That is why we should proceed slowly and cautiously in 
this area. But I don’t think this is a case for the precautionary principle. If that 
principle should be invoked at all, it is only in cases of potential disaster. Allowing 
more and more greenhouse gases to be put into the atmosphere is an example – the 
risks of unpredictable climate change are huge, and it is not justified to incur such 
risks if we can avoid doing so with, at most, only small sacrifices to our standard of 
living. But if we create a small number of human beings who will suffer some 
adverse psychological or social consequences, that is not an irreversible disaster on a 
large scale, serious as it may be for the people who suffer these consequences.  
 
The greater concern with “private eugenics” is that it will introduce a two-tier 
society, in which the rich can pay for genetic selection that will lead them to have 
enhanced children – perhaps more intelligent, or more athletic, or healthier – while 
the poor cannot afford such assistance. Then the class division will, over generations, 
be underpinned by a sharp genetic divide. I would not like to see such a society. But 
it isn’t clear how it will be possible to prohibit the rich from taking advantage of 
genetic selection for enhancement. Even if this is banned in some countries, they will 
be able to travel to others. (I doubt that it will be possible to persuade all 
governments to ban genetic enhancement, because different governments have 
different attitudes to it.) Think how much parents will do now to get the best possible 
education for their children. Many of them would do at least as much to ensure that 
their children have the best genetic advantages, especially if that proves efficacious 
at getting them into elite educational institutions. The best solution may be for the 
Interview with Pr. Peter SINGER 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 4 (1), 2006,  
http://ethique-economique.org/ 
6 
state to actually provide financial assistance for those who would like to use genetic 
selection to enhance their children, but cannot afford to do so.” 
 
J.D.: -“ Recently, the Spanish parliament discussed the proposition “Gran Simio Proyecto” 
which intended to give human rights to four species: cheetahs, bonobos, gorillas and 
orang-outangs. It is a great success for you as president of the Great Ape Project 
organization. However, aren’t you guilty of some sort of “speciesism” for spending 
time and money for this cause, which concerns only a few thousand animals, when 
there are billions of animals (humans included) unjustly suffering throughout the 
World (that I confess you also defend through other actions and books)? Or, do 
ecological threats necessitate more rights to certain species than to others?” 
 
P.S.: -“ When Paola Cavalieri and I founded the Great Ape Project, it was not because apes 
are endangered, but because they are so close to us in their intelligence and rich 
emotional life, that we thought the case for giving them some basic rights would be 
more difficult to resist. Also we were conscious of the fact that there is no major 
industry built on the exploitation of great apes – as there is with pigs or chickens, for 
example – and so that there might be less opposition to such an idea. But we never 
thought of the Great Ape Project as a project that would only benefit great apes. On 
the contrary, we saw it, and still see it, as a way of bridging the gap between humans 
and other animals. (The initials of Great Ape Project spell “gap,” a nice touch, we 
thought, when we coined the name.) 
 
At present we think of humans as one category, and animals as another, as if we are 
more distinct from a chimpanzee than a chimpanzee is from a mouse. But in genetic 
terms that is ridiculous – in fact we are the chimpanzee’s closest relative, closer to 
chimpanzees than they are to gorillas, let alone other animals. This dichotomous way 
of thinking is also reflected in the thought that only humans have moral status, and 
all animals are just “things”, with no rights at all. If the Great Ape Project succeeds 
in gaining recognition for the rights of great apes, it will become easier to recognize 
that other animals are also not mere things, and deserve some rights too.” 
 
J.D.: -“ Utilitarianism was seen in the 18th  and 19th centuries as a philosophy supporting 
social progress, a liberal stance against monarchic, totalitarian, religious oppression. 
However, though your political action is clearly left and green oriented, one can ask 
if your theory of utilitarianism does not confirm today’s liberal capitalist system by 
just amending it slightly. Instead of promoting charity for the poorest, or discussing 
the rights of some disabled persons, don’t you think that a true reformist would 
encourage the development of the poor’s capabilities to improve by themselves their 
own economic situation or to promote values that will encourage the acceptance and 
care of disabled persons?” 
 
P.S.: -“ You seem to think that I do not encourage the development of the poor’s capabilities 
to improve by themselves their own economic situation, or encourage the acceptance 
and care of disabled persons. But I do – the best development aid does encourage the 
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poor’s capabilities to improve their own economic situation. I have always 
particularly supported members of the international Oxfam group, which do exactly 
this.   
 
You also seem to think that my view about the justifiability of killing severely 
disabled infants somehow implies that I do not think we should accept and care for 
disabled persons. But that is another error. My view is specifically about infants, or 
those who do not have, and never have had, the capacity to express a view about 
whether they wish to continue to live. Those people with disabilities who are living 
in our community should be fully accepted, with laws to prohibit discrimination 
against them in areas like employment, where their disabilities are not relevant to 
their ability to do the job in question. I also think that nations should, within the 
limits of their resources, provide the best possible care for people with disabilities. 
 
So there is nothing contrary to my views, or to utilitarianism, in your suggestions. 
Utilitarianism is always open to new factual information, about what is the best way 
to bring about improvements. In that sense it is neither capitalist nor socialist, nor 
anarchist, nor anything else. If it turns out that capitalism is the best way of 
satisfying preferences, then the utilitarian will be for capitalism. If it turns out that 
socialism is the best, the utilitarian will be for socialism. If it turns out that 
anarchism is, then the utilitarian will be for anarchism. Or perhaps there will be other 
options. The utilitarian will remain open to them too.” 
 
J.D.: -“ The last question about economics. Even if one considers your vision of 
cosmopolitan charity not revolutionary enough, one can concede that it may give a 
sense of duty and life to people who give their money to the poor, and create a sense 
of global cooperation among humans which is good in itself. However, isn’t this 
solution condemned to be marginal? Indeed, it is as if you wanted to correct the 
world economy’s inequalities by a concept of world “charity market”, which does 
not guarantee justice or a clear change, as we already see in the USA, where private 
charity does not prevent the richest country from having a large proportion of poor 
citizens, and even to suffer from child hunger. From the perspective of a rational 
individual, if one spends too much money in charity business, one will quickly 
become worse than his competitors and the less generous people eventually manage 
to dry up the potential of generous donors. 
 
In contrast, we have recently seen Warren Buffet giving 30 billion dollars to a 
charity fund, which appears ethically sound and potentially very effective when we 
learn that he did that for meritocratic egalitarianism, i.e. in order to contest the 
privilege given to the “heirs” in general and his in particular. Every human being 
should mainly rely on the money he gets by her own work and merits. Couldn’t this 
principle be more effectively generalized, in order to banish fortune heritage and 
spend the money collected to alleviate poverty?” 
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P.S.: -“ Since the dominant ethical view in the United States is based on rights, rather than 
utility, and both philosophical and popular thinking is generally hostile to utilitarian 
ways of thinking, it is not possible to take the United States as a test case of a 
utilitarian solution to the question of poverty. In contrast, Sweden, where utilitarian 
thinking is much more widely accepted, has a strong social welfare system and 
virtually no poverty. If the U.S. government were utilitarian, it would behave more 
like the Swedish government and – putting aside the issue of foreign aid - allocate 
far more of its budget to supporting the poorest people in the country. 
   
Warren Buffet’s principle is a good one, but it is good because it is likely to have 
good consequences, both in terms of the money that is given away – as long as it is 
given to the right causes, as Buffet’s own donation was – and in terms of the 
inculcation of the virtues of independence in the children of the wealthy. So it is, 
once again, not an alternative to utilitarianism, but, if these factual assumptions are 
correct, an implication of utilitarianism. It is also, I should add, complementary too, 
rather than in competition with, my suggestion that people should give away a lot of 
their income all through their lives. There is no need to save all the giving for near 
the end, as Buffet has done. Of course, he happens to have been a superb investor, 
and so by retaining it and investing it, was able to give away more in the end. But 
most of us are not as good at doing that as Buffet was. And what if he had been hit 
by a bus before he had given it away? Would his heirs have given it away, as he did? 
We can never know what will happen after our death, which is an important reason 
for giving money away while we are alive.” 
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